. But, as I shall now show, there is a deeper problem with his approach which his modification does not shake off.
The problem stems from the truth of the following compatibility claim:
(CC) A term's restrictedly rigidly designating (RR-designating) an object x is compatible with it designating an object y in a world W where x exists but is distinct from y.
1
It follows from (CC) that the necessary (contingent) truth of a sentence of the form "α is identical with β", where "α" and "β" are RRDs of objects x and y respectively, does not require the necessary (contingent) identity of x and y. This is borne out by Gallois' original example (see 1986, p. 58-63) . Taking W to be the actual world, we have:
"Mary is identical with Mary" is necessarily true; yet "Mary" RRdesignates Mary and Alice, which are only contingently identical.
1 I leave it to the reader to check that in Gallois' own example (1986, p. 58) , on the view he defends (pp. 62-63), and despite his modified characterisation of restricted rigidity, RDC# (1993, p. xx), "Mary" RR-designates Alice (as well as Mary) in W, but designates Mary and not A/ice in W 1 . Gallois has accepted this in correspondence. In light of (CC), while I agree with Gallois (1993, p. 153 ) that:
) is a theorem given RDC#, I dispute his defence of it (on p. 153). For, if (CC) is correct, the antecedent of (7) could be true even though a and b are identical in every world (where either exists)! This presents a major problem for Gallois' approach. Let x and y be any contingently identical objects; if, as I have argued, the contingent truth of a sentence of the form "α is identical with β", where "α" and "β" RR-designate x and y respectively, does not require the contingent identity of x and y, how are we to express their contingent identity? The problem is that any candidate sentence involving RRDs one might consider could just as well be said to express (falsely) the contingent identity of x and x, since any RRD of y would also be an RRD of x.
Of course, there is an obvious way of resolving this problem, but I do not think
it is open to Gallois! If "α" and "β" were restrictedly rigid à la RDC* (floated in (i.e. so that, informally, a term RR-designates an object, u, in a world, W, iff whatever object it designates in any world, W′, is identical with u in W′) then it would indeed be reasonable to maintain that the contingent truth of "α is identical with β" signifies the contingent identity of x and y. But "α" could not in that case RR-designate both x and y, because it could not designate both in worlds in which they are distinct (remember, they are only contingently identical by hypothesis). So, to adopt such a solution would be to give up on Leibniz's Law: for we would be maintaining that x and y are identical, but that the former is RR-designated by "α" while the latter is not.
Since Gallois is keen to preserve Leibniz's Law (1993, p. xx) , I take it this is a The challenge, then, is to provide a way of using RRDs to express a genuine contingent identity (the contingent identity of x and y, say) without at the same time expressing, falsely, the contingent identity of an object and itself (e.g. the contingent identity of x and x) and without flouting Leibniz's Law. Until this challenge is met, I
stand by earlier (1992) conclusion: restricting rigidity in the manner Gallois suggests is not adequate for his needs.
